Hindustan Computers Limited Hcl Commerce Essay HCL Technologies is one of the seven companies in the Bloomberg database of 3,000 technology companies with a market capitalization of more than $5 billion, revenue of more than $2.5 billion and a compounded annual growth rate more than 25 per cent during the past five years (HCL Technologies Limited, 2012). Definition of Success at HCL means providing the best possible solutions to their clients with optimum level of satisfaction. HCL Technologies is the Number 1 employer in India. 1.1 History Hindustan Computers Limited (HCL), one of Indias original IT firms started in 1976 currently deals in various segments like Remote Infrastructure Management, BPO services, IT Hardware, Systems Integration and Distribution of Technology and Telecom products RD and Technology Services and Enterprise and Applications Consulting is Indias original IT firm. Started 35 years ago, the enterprise now stands with an enormous workforce of 90,000 employees. it spreads across 31 countries across the globe and has 505 foothills in India. A global name and numerous partnerships with many Fortune 1000 firms are a few feathers in the HCLs success story (HCL, 2012). 1.2 Ownership Fast Facts HCL Technologies Company Name HCL Technologies Ltd. Company Type Global IT Company Service Areas Software, Infrastructure and BPO Date of Establishment November 12, 1991 Chairman and Chief Strategy Officer Shiv Nadar Vice Chairman CEO Vineet Nayar Employee Strength 85,335 on 30thÂ September 2012. Offices Offices in 31 countries Geographies USA, Europe, Asia Pacific and Japan Consolidated Revenues US$ 4.3 billion (Rs. 22,417 crores), as on 30thÂ September 2012 1.3 Businesses HCL is a leading global Technology and IT Enterprise with annual revenues of US$ 6.2 billion. The HCL Enterprise comprises two companies listed in India, HCL Technologies and HCL Infosystems. HCL Snapshot 1.4 Location HCL Technologies as a $4.3 billion global company brings IT and engineering services expertise under one umbrella to solve complex business problems for its clients. It leverages its global offshore infrastructure and network of offices in 31 countries. HCL provide multi-service, holistic delivery in industries such as financial services, consumer services, manufacturing, healthcare and public services. Organizational Structure The Indian conventional way of working leads to a vertical hierarchical structure, which is with founder as the head and certain subordinates below him. Being a technical expertise company, the hierarchy depends on the level of knowledge gained by the professionals. Due to no inter department interfering, the transfer of knowledge is more on vertical basis but very rarely horizontal. Vision To be the technology partner of choice for forward looking customers by collaboratively transforming technology into business advantage.(HCL, 2012) Mission We will be the employer of choice and the partner of choice by focusing on our stated values of Employees First, Trust, Transparency, Flexibility and Value Centricity. (HCL, 2012) Leadership style, approaches etc HCLs leadership style follows the rule of free-rein rather than the contemporary participative method. It is clearly noticeable from the recent development of a defined approach of Employees First Customers Seconds (EFCS). Now days the leaders give full authority to their employees to make decisions but at the same time, take the responsibility of the same. It helps the company to build future leaders who would be better decision makers and also motivation to the employees for analysing situations better and working with respect to them. Delegating tasks is an important tool which should be followed and practiced in corporate and fortunately is followed in the HCL. It helps build confidence and trust among co-workers aiding a pleasant and healthy work environment. This is kind of leadership style is also known as laissez faire, which is the non-interference in the affairs of others (Clark, 2010). Expertise of employees is the key to HCLs success. HCL firmly believes that a firms employees makes the company reach pinnacle heights. Highly qualified and well trained employees are a part of the HCL clan. When knowledge comes into picture, expert power is the power used by employees. Its the knowledge that makes a person stand out in the crowd of all employees. Expert Power is a very common phenomenon in knowledge based industries(Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1973). Culture unique language, culture, rituals etc. A place where people can think and imagine endless possibilities is the best way to describe HCL. Freedom of thought is very important to extract the additional creativity at work. With a bright history of 35 years, HCL has stood by its core values and philosophy of creating innovations and inventions. HCL has a very rigid demarcation of working in their own department, which implies that employees are not allowed to work in other department other than their own which gradually spoils the inter-departmental relationships. In case of absenteeism too, workers are not allowed to switch department to avoid gaps in enhancing productivity. http://d15mj6e6qmt1na.cloudfront.net/files/images/0053/9998/employees.jpg Rigid policies, tapered span of control and high degree of centralization and formalization are few things associated with HCL. Within departments HCL employees have freedom of processing their thoughts but not inter-departmentally. The organization was bureaucratic structure. However, HCL has initiated a new management approach where the employees of HCL are considered first and then the customers. It is termed as Employees-First Effect which according to Mr. Vineet, CEO is the reason for the company being employee centric and employee driven. It is very much like trimming the conventional method upside down. This not only helps in building confidence and motivation among employees but also transparent work environment. 4.1 Group Dynamics/Team Building initiatives Since there is a lack of inter departmental transfer of knowledge, coordination is at stake at HCL. It followed an Indian conventional method of getting approval from the top management and then would the task be carried forward. After the new management approach of employees first and customers second, the company has started giving more liberty to the employees in terms of taking decisions which makes them feel a part of the organization. It enhances their rationale thinking enabling them to give their 100%. Change management initiatives Change is an inevitable process in management. Just like aging of an individual cannot be hampered in any manner, in the same manner change in management is the need of the day. A company cannot work in the same manner as it was working 10-15years ago. This change came to HCL in 2005 when the sales were low in that period. HCLl alarmed itself before the nick of the time and changed its models and strategies to work according to the customer needs. This is what saved them from the 2009 recession.HCL is one of the very few companies who showed growth even in the recession years. Business models and good managements are the keys to the foresight vision of the market. HCL converted itself from a traditional company to a Generation Y genre. (BMC Software, 2010) Innovation / Creativity initiatives Engaging the employees where they feel a part of the firm and making them realise that they are as important as the customers is a new example of managing employees that Mr.VIneet, the CEO has set in for all the global companies. A unique management technique which makes sure that the workforce of 90,000 employees remains satisfied in order to enhance employee satisfaction but also lead to more than 100% productivity. Turning technology into a manifest advantage for the clients is what HCL is best at. Critique on the current internal scenario / internal environment including people practices An agent promised a customer a delivery of a certain product in a specific time period. The dispatch manager was on leave. So his subordinate took the task in his hand and made sure that the delivery is done on time. But to his horror, he received a note stating that he is not liable to do so because of lack of authority. This incident just proves that the management is very rigid and has a narrow control style of working, which poses as a threat to self motivation of employees to excel in their work and be an overall manager. Suggestions and recommendations Communication should not be considered as an event within a container where employees broadcast oral and written messages instead should be deemed as a continuous process of conveying thoughts and interpretations throughout the organization. Individual learning and focus groups should be included in the working of HCL. It not only enhances individual productivity and skill development but also overall wellness of the firm. Gaining insights from vertical structure of hierarchy should be implemented so as to avoid miscommunications and lagging of work. Assuming others are happy is never the solution to a problem. Therefore, it is very important for the firm to start taking feedback from their employees to know how much justice is the firm doing to the employees. Conclusion Three values on which HCLs cornerstone is based are trust, flexibility and Employee Effect First. All three values make the company a desirable company to work for. Trust is created by pushing the trust envelope. Be flexible with respect to employees and situations is what a good company would associate itself with. The unique management approach of employee first and customers second inhibit the company to be an employee centric. Employees being an responsibility of the management and customers being a responsibility of the employees. Therefore, I would like to work in a company where employees are recognised, valued and rewarded for their performance. Bibliography BMC Software (2010) ELO: Articles: HCL Technologies CEO Talks about Building a Culture to Drive IT Productivity, August. Available at: http://www.enterpriseleadership.org/blogs/Articles/2010/08/10/hcl-technologies-ceo-talks-about-building-a-culture-to-drive-it-productivity (Accessed: 15 December 2012). Clark, D. (2010) Leadership Styles. Available at: http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/leader/leadstl.html (Accessed: 16 December 2012). HCL (2011) Employees First, Customers Second | Business Change Management. Available at: http://www.employeesfirstbook.com/ (Accessed: 15 December 2012). HCL (2012) Overview. Available at: http://www.hcl.in/overview.asp (Accessed: 15 December 2012). HCL Technologies Limited (2012) About HCL Technologies | IT Services, Outsourcing Software Development, IT Solutions | HCL Technologies. Available at: http://www.hcltech.com/about-us/about-hcl-technologies (Accessed: 10 December 2012). Tannenbaum, R. and Schmidt, W.H. (1973) How to Choose a leadership Pattern, Harvard Business Review, May-June, pp.162-180 HBR Classic [Online]. Available at: http://www.elcamino.edu/faculty/bcarr/documents/How%20to%20choose%20a%20leadership%20pattern.pdf (Accessesd: 15 December 2012).
Proselytism, Conversion and the Freedom to Change Religion
A Critical Analysis
This dissertation seeks to critique the extent to which Article 9 of the ECHR upholds an individuals â€œfreedom to change his religion and beliefâ€. It is respectfully submitted that the landmark decisions of the European court have provided inconsistent guidance with respect to the issues surrounding proselytism, conversion and the freedom to change ones religion; consequently, this will have significant implications on interreligious dialogue and the protections on the rights of adherents of new religious movements, minority religions, and religious converts. This paper proposes that the ECtHR jurisprudence ought to consider the theoretical perspectives advanced by Stahnke, Danchin, and Taylor to strengthen the protections of ones freedom to change their religion, underscoring that a careful consideration of these theoretical approaches may provide a positive contribution to protecting the freedom of religion more generally.
Chapter 1: Issues surrounding proselytism, conversion and the Freedom of Religion
Stahnke highlights that the development of international principles governing the issues surrounding proselytism â€˜is no easy task, especially in consideration of the varied state approaches to proselytism. After reflecting upon the Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to the complicated issues arising from cases relating to proselytism, an individuals right to change his or her religion, and the freedom of religion espoused by Article 9, this paper asserts that Stahnkes statement is not only true in the global context, but is particularly acute in the European context as well. In this connection, it is evident that that the issues relating to proselytism pose pragmatic difficulties for jurists because it requires them to adjudicate between competing and conflicting rights claims. As Malcolm Evans highlights, â€œhow can the fundamental right of one individual to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion be reconciled with the fundamental right to another to the same freedom, when the very possession of those beliefs might require a believer to present his views to others?â€ In other words, the court has to determine, as Witte has concisely stated, â€œWhose rites get rights?â€
This paper begins its analysis by suggesting that the protections of an individuals right to change his or her religion as well as its corresponding links with proselytism is further complicated by the theoretical disagreements concerning the legal definitions of religion, and the freedom of religion. For example, Carolyn Evans notes that even if a collection of states agree to be bound by an international agreement adhering to a general principle protecting the freedom of religion, it is possible that the states conceptual understanding over the rights and values at stake may differ significantly. She further contends that the subsequent interpretations of Article 9 in the European court mirror the aforementioned problem. Similarly, the complexity of human rights issues relating to religion contribute to the challenges of formulating an overarching framework of adjudication since religion is inextricably linked with nationalistic and political participation, particular family histories and cultures, spiritual and philosophical sentiments, and differing conceptions of morality.
1.2: Religion and the difficulties of definition
According to Gunn, a judge sitting on the European Court and their particularly personal definitions of â€˜religion plays a considerable role in shaping that judges interpretations of Article 9 under the European Convention and how cases ought to be decided. For example, judicial conceptions of religion may have significant practical implications on applicants seeking to determine whether or not a new religious movement or minority religion receives tax exemption status, or whether a persecuted religious asylum seeker is able to claim refugee status. As we will soon discover, a judges conception of religion is likely to influence his/her decisions in cases involving proselytism and conversion. However, this is complicated by the fact that the actual definition of religion under Article 9 does not exist since the issues of definition have been fraught with controversy since the drafting of the United Nations International Instruments, on which Article 9 is based.
Gunn astutely observes that there are underlying methodological difficulties concerning the natural definition of religion which necessarily involve assumptions concerning the nature of a religionâ€”i.e., religions metaphysical nature and/or theological conceptions of religion, the psychological experience of adherents, and the socio-cultural impact of religionâ€”and whether or not there are features that all religions share in commonâ€”i.e., does a religion have to possess a theistic element, or would a polytheistic, atheistic, or non-theistic conception of religion suffice? Carolyn Evans highlights that although the European Court and Commission have adopted a broad, generous and liberal approach to defining religion, it is important to note that the courts have ruled that a religion ought to attain a sufficient degree of â€œcogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importanceâ€ to justify protection under Article 9. Consequently, as Evan notes, vague conceptions of religion are beyond the scope of the protections under Article 9. However, she also suggests that although there may be a genuine sincerity of an applicants beliefs, the requirement that an applicants belief possess a level of sufficient coherence â€œhas the potential to exclude some more individualistic and personal beliefsâ€.
In this connection, it has been argued that legal definitions must also consider a range of other factors such as (a) â€˜protecting freedom of religion, or (b) â€˜prohibiting discrimination of religionâ€”tasks that are difficult to adjudicate because of the range of different opinions as to what exactly constitutes the nature of religion, and what specific manifestations of religion warrant protection.
The jurisprudence surrounding freedom of religion cases under Article 9 appear to distinguish between the â€˜private boundaries of religion and its inextricable links to the â€˜internal adoption of a particular religious belief, with the â€˜public boundaries and its corresponding links to â€˜external manifestations of religious belief; these concepts are occasionally referred to as the forum internum and forum externum respectively. Evans highlights that the interpretation of Article 9 typically underscores the primacy of the forum internumâ€”that is, â€œthe private thought, conscience, and religion of the individualâ€ and it is generally asserted that the state is prohibited from interfering with the forum internum. However, it is unclear as to where the line between the â€˜private conscience and â€˜public expression, or forum internum and forum externum is to be drawn, especially considering that many religions do not necessarily define themselves in such dualistic terms. For example, in highlighting the theoretical uncertainty in relation to the scope of the forum internum, Sullivan argues â€œmany religious doctrines or beliefs dictate standards of social conduct and responsibility, and require believers to act accordingly. For those who follow such precepts of social responsibility, the distinction between religious and political activities may be artificialâ€. Similarly, Gunn underscores the importance for judges to consider the multifaceted nature of religion in that it not only comprises an applicants â€˜belief, but also an applicants â€˜identity and â€˜way of life. Thus, he argues that â€œthe adjudicator should seek to understand the religious facets of such cases not from the perspective of a person who might attend religious services a few times a year, but from the perspective of those who have chosen to devote their lives fully to their religion as they understand itâ€. In other words, a prudential approach from the standpoint of an adjudicator would not merely reduce the definition of religion to the mere domain of the private sphere, but would take account of how an individuals private belief intersects and overlaps with his or her public manifestation of belief. Nowhere is the overlap between an individuals private belief and public manifestation of belief more evident than in the issues surrounding proselytism and conversionâ€”a subject to which we now turn.
1.3: Linkages between, and issues surrounding, proselytism, conversion and the freedom of religion
Given that Article 9 aims not only to protect an applicants private conceptions of religion, but also an individuals right to manifest his or her religion subject to certain limitations, Danchin and Stahnke similarly argue that because proclaiming and sharing ones faith is such an important and integral aspect of a host of world religions, it would be logically inconsistent if the attempt to convince another to adopt ones religious belief, experiences and faith was beyond the scope of protections under the freedom to manifest religion. Additionally, it has also been suggested that â€œin modern human rights law, the right to change ones religion, in the absence of coercion and as a result of free will is considered a recognised freedomâ€.
Stahnke observes that the issues surrounding proselytism and conversion involve competing rights between the â€˜sourceâ€”that is, the proselytiser, the â€˜targetâ€”that is, the individual receiving the information, and the role that the state should play in balancing the conflicting and competing rights between â€˜source and â€˜target. Hence, it is evident that the multifaceted nature of proselytism and conversion present significant challenges for the jurist in reconciling competing claims to the freedom of religion under article 9. Witte concisely summarises the â€˜modern problems of proselytism by asking,
How does the state balance ones community right to exercise and expand its faith versus another persons or community right to be left alone to its own traditions? How does the state protect the juxtaposed rights claims of majority and minority religions or of foreign and indigenous religions? How does the state craft a general rule to govern multiple theological understandings of conversion or change of religion?
Although an analysis of the array of theological perspectives of conversion and the change of religion is beyond the scope of this study, this subject is worth mentioning in order to illuminate the challenges of protecting the freedom of an individuals right to change his or her religion. For example, Witte notes that most Western conceptions of Christianity â€œhave easy conversion into and out of the faithâ€, whereas â€œmost Jews have difficult conversion into and out of the faithâ€. However, traditional Islamic perspectives prohibit proselytism directed towards Muslims, but encourage Islamic proselytism towards nonbelievers. Although traditional Islamic perspectives on proselytism have significantly influenced state policies restricting proselytism, it is evident that the phenomenon of the pervasive role of religion and its influence on state practices is undoubtedly mirrored in the European context as illustrated by the facts in Kokkinakis v. Greece.
Chapter 2: Freedom to change religion: The seminal case: Kokkinakis
The decisive judgment concerning the protections of religious freedoms as well as the issues surrounding proselytism is illustrated in Kokkinakis v. Greece. Gunn notes that between 1955 and 1993, only 45 of 20,000 applications challenging Article 9 were published by the European Commission, and Kokkinakis was the first case to be considered under Article 9 where the court found a member state in violation of the provisions protecting the freedom of religion.
2.1 The facts
In 1936 at the age of 17, Mr. Kokkinakis converted from Greek Orthodoxy into the minority Jehovahs Witness religion and was arrested over 60 times, and imprisoned on several occasions for proselytism throughout the course of his life. After exhausting all domestic remedies, Mr. Kokkinakis applied to the European Commission on Human Rights in 1988, who unanimously declared that there had been a violation of Article 9. His case was then submitted to the European court. By a 6-3 majority, the court held that there had been a breach of Mr. Kokkanakis freedom of religion under article 9.
2.2: The reasoning of the court
The court reasoned that the â€œfreedom of thought, conscience and religionâ€ is one of the hallmarks of a pluralistic democratic societyâ€”serving not only as a protection for ardent religious believersâ€”but also for â€œatheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcernedâ€. In this connection, the court affirmed the right to manifest ones religion encompasses not only public and private expressions of belief, but also â€œincludes in principle the right to try to convince ones neighbourâ€. Otherwise, the provision in Article 9 protecting the â€˜freedom to change [ones] religion or belief â€œwould be likely to remain a dead letterâ€.
However, the court issued a caveat, acknowledging
that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyones beliefs are respected.
To sum up the courts ruling, under Article 9(1), sections 31-36 of the judgment highlight that the sentence imposed by the Greek government interfered with Mr. Kokkanakiss right to manifest his religion under Article 9. However, the court then sought to determine whether the restrictions imposed on Mr. Kokkanakis by the Greek government were permissible under Article 9(2) by referring to the three tests of whether the actions were â€˜prescribed by law, had a â€˜legitimate aim, and whether the actions were â€˜necessary in a democratic society. Firstly, in paragraphs 40-41, the court highlighted that the existence of domestic case law prohibiting proselytism fell within the meaning of â€˜prescribed by law within â€˜Article 9(2) of the convention.
Secondly, the courts sought to determine whether the governments â€˜measure was in pursuit of a legitimate aim. The courts affirmed the Greek governments arguments that it was obliged to protect â€œthe peaceful enjoyment of the person freedoms of all those living on its territoryâ€, and therefore, â€œthe impugned measure was in pursuit of a legitimate aim under Article 9(2), namely the protection of the rights and freedoms of othersâ€.
Finally, the court referred to the doctrine of the â€˜margin of appreciationâ€”which permits States to â€œassess the existence and extent of the necessity of an interferencesubject to European supervisionâ€. To do this, the court distinguished between â€˜proper and â€˜improper proselytism, highlighting that the former is a reflection of â€œtrue evangelismand the responsibility of every Christian and every churchâ€ whereas the latter is a â€œcorruption or deformation of itâ€. The court also noted that a coercive expression of proselytism could â€œtake the form of activities offering material or social advantages with a view to gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or in need; it may even entail the use of violence or brainwashingâ€. Thus, any coercive expression would be deemed incompatible with the provisions set out in Article 9(2). Consequently, the court held that the Greek government failed to demonstrate that Mr. Kokkinakiss proselytising activities were of a coercive nature. Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court highlighted that Mr. Kokkinakiss criminal conviction was unjustified on the grounds of a â€˜pressing social need; therefore, Court ruled in favour of Mr. Kokkinakis, citing the measures enacted by the Greek government failed to demonstrate that they were â€œproportionate to the legitimate aim pursuedâ€ or â€œnecessary in a democratic societyfor the protection of the rights and freedoms of othersâ€.
2.3: The polarised responses of the judges
It is interesting to highlight the polarised responses between some of the judges, as it is clear that particular understandings of religion and proselytism played a decisive role in shaping the judicial opinion in Kokkinakis. On the one hand, it is apparent that Judge Martens analysis prioritised the rights of the proselytiser, where he reasoned that
it is not within the province of the State to interfere in this â€˜conflict between proselytiser and proselytised. First, becauseâ€”since respect for human dignity and human freedom implies that the State is bound to accept that in principle everybody is capable of determining his fate in a way that he deems bestâ€”there is no justification for the State to use its power â€˜to protect the proselytisedSecondly, because even the â€˜public order argument cannot justify use of coercive State power in a field where tolerance demands that â€˜free argument and debate should be decisive. And thirdly, because under the Convention all religions and beliefs should, as far as the State is concerned, be equal.
Judge Martens further argues that the
â€œState, being bound to strict neutrality in religious matters, lacks the necessary touchstone and therefore should not set itself up as the arbiter for assessing whether particular religious behaviour is â€˜proper or â€˜improper. [secondly], the rising tide of religious intolerance makes it imperative to keep the States powers in this field within the strictest possible boundaries.
In other words, states are under a strict duty to minimise interfering in an individuals freedom to manifest religion as much as possible. Conversely, on the opposite extreme, Judge Valtico gave primacy to the rights of the target by arguing that the recipient of a â€˜conversion effort has a right to a peaceful enjoyment of his or her religion, and therefore ought to be protected from unwanted attempts to changing his or her religion:
Let us look now at the facts of the case. On the one hand, we have a militant Jehovahs Witness, a hardbitten adept of proselytism, a specialist in conversion, a martyr of the criminal courts whose earlier convictions have served only to harden him in his militancy, and, on the other hand, the ideal victim, a naive woman, the wife of a cantor in the Orthodox Church (if he manages to convert her, what a triumph!). He swoops on her, trumpets that he has good news for her (the play on words is obvious but no doubt to her), manages to get himself let in and, as an experienced commercial traveller and cunning purveyor of a faith he wants to spread, expounds to her his intellectual wares cunningly wrapped up in a mantle of universal peace and radiant happiness. Who, indeed, would not like peace and happiness? But in this the mere exposition of Mr. Kokkinakiss beliefs or is it not rather an attempt to beguile the simple soul of the cantors wife? Does the Convention afford its protection to such undertakings? Certainly not.
We now turn to the criticisms of Kokkinakis and the subsequent case law and its relationship to proselytism, conversion and the Freedom of Religion.
Chapter 3: Criticisms and observations of the case law
3.1 Critique of Judge Martens Judge Valtico
Naivety and prejudice in legal reasoning
As mentioned in the previous chapter, both judges reasoning reflect extreme positions of adjudication. On the one hand, judge Martensâ€”a judge aligning his perspective with the majorityâ€” upheld a strict position of minimal state interference into an individuals freedom to manifest his or her religion by appealing to a principle of â€˜strict neutrality whereas judge Valticos dissenting judgement reflected a hostile view of the applicants particular manifestation of religion. It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning of both judges illustrated naivety and prejudice respectively.
It has been argued Judge Martens position merely reduced the issues surrounding proselytism to the competing rights claims of the personal, autonomous, and individualistic manifestation of the proselytiser with the rights claims of adherents of the majority religion and the majoritys attendant conceptions of the â€˜common good. Whilst true that the court had to adjudicate between the competing rights claims of the adherent of a minority religion with the â€˜collective good, it is submitted that judge Martens not only overlooked the competing and conflicting individual rights claims of the proselytisers right to share his/her faith with the individual rights claims of the recipient of the attempted proselytism to peacefully enjoy and practice his/her freedom of religion, but also the competing and conflicting conceptions of the common good as well. Moreover, judge Martens also referred to the notion that the state is bound to â€˜strict neutrality with respect to â€˜religious matters; however, his contention begs the question of whether there is such a concept of â€˜religious neutrality in the first place?
3.1.2: Prejudice: Privileging majority over minority religions
Conversely, judge Valticos position has been widely criticised on the grounds that it demonstrates a biased and prejudicial approach consequently privileging the rights of adherents of the established religion over the rights of adherents of minority religions. At one point, judge Valtico even suggested that proselytism amounts to â€œrape of the belief of othersâ€ but it is apparent that this perspective dismisses the centrality of proselytism to the beliefs of Jehovahs Witnesses and that such beliefs could potentially contribute to the common good.
Consequently, it is evident that judge Valticos position demonstrates significant hostility towards the practices of minority religions such as the Jehovahs Witnesses as well as an individuals freedom of religion. By casting a minority religious group in such negative terms, an unsettling consequence nevertheless arises in that religious liberty becomes further threatened, and a public backlash towards such groups could potentially ensue. Moreover, this could have insidious and deleterious effects on interreligious dialogue between adherents of majority religious groups, with adherents of new, minority religious movements aiming to promote a heightened understanding of their novel religious practices, hopes of integrating into the broader socio-cultural milieu, and quest for legitimacy. Additionally, it is contended that judge Valticos view is an affront to the hallmarks of human rights law and its corresponding commitments to non-discrimination and equality.
Perhaps judge Valticos position reflects the deference of the European Court to the constitutions, practices and statutes of member states overtly privileging the position of established churches, whilst correspondingly neglecting the impact of such laws on adherents of minority religious groups. Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that acts of proselytism conducted by adherents of the Greek Orthodox faith have not resulted in arrest, unlike the proselytising actions of religious minorities; consequently, an implicit value in judicial support of the Greek Governments actions is the notion that â€œthe law is applied in Greece to allow prosecutorial decisions based on an individuals religious status, not his or her actionsâ€. Furthermore, one of the pressing anxieties over the privileged position of the established churches in member states is that such protections create a â€˜two-tiered system of religious rights which will continue to afford major mainstream churches the full rights, privileges, and immunities that are associated with traditional parameters of religious freedom, while simultaneously denying minority religions and new religious movements both equal legal status for their organizations and equal protection for their adherents.
In doing so, this paper submits that the reasoning offered by the European Court potentially inhibits the protections of religious freedom more generally. Furthermore, this paper maintains that judge Valticos perspective could have insidious and deleterious effects not only on the freedom of religion of religious minorities, but also the freedom of religion for adherents of dominant religious faiths as well. For example, some national legislators may claim to be enacting general or â€˜neutrally applicable laws, but the outcomes do not necessarily reflect this; rather, they serve as an indicia of a privileged majority restricting the expansion of specific religious minorities, especially in member states where powerful churches aligned with the state can wield formidable political pressure on governments. In this connection, perhaps we can surmise that if a hypothetical faction within a privileged religious group were to dissent from a religious majority powerfully aligned with the state, the faction could potentially encounter significant limitations to their religious freedom. Perhaps the astute observations of a revolutionary writing from prison in 1916 underscoring the importance of protecting the freedoms of minority groups would provide some insight to assist the courts adjudication: â€œFreedom only for supporters of the government, for members of the partyâ€”though they are quite numerousâ€”is no freedom at all. Freedom always means freedom for the dissentersâ€.
Consequently, the Kokkinakis decision has been problematic because the judges seemed to have minimised and dismissed the complexity of the theoretical and substantive issues relating to justified state intervention in cases involving proselytism, and only found an â€˜impermissible violation of an individuals freedom of religion when the specific facts arose in the case, rather than attempting to develop broader principles surrounding proselytism when given the opportunity. We now turn to the critiques surrounding the courts adjudication regarding the limitations to religious freedom and permissible scope of state restrictions under article 9(2) of the ECHR.
3.2 Prescribed by law: Implications and the purpose of domestic legislation
Although the court accepted that the Greek governments restrictions on proselytism were prescribed by law and had a legitimate aim in Kokkinakis, the Court eventually held that the Greek government failed to demonstrate that the measures were â€˜necessary and â€˜proportionate in a democratic society.
However, a common criticism of the Kokkinakis decision is that the courts failed to develop substantive protections of the rights of religious minorities and unpopular religions to proselytise as well as the concomitant rights of individuals to change their religion. For example, Taylor highlights that the European courts failure to â€œimpugn Greeces anti-proselytism lawâ€ consequently ignored both the purpose of the legislation and the reality that the domestic law was often consistently applied as an instrument of discrimination. Similarly, it is also worthwhile to note that the courts only adjudicated on the particular facts of the case rather than developing broader principles in relation to proselytism and the freedom to change ones religion. In this connection, by merely narrowing its focus on Mr. Kokkinakis conviction, it is evident that the court failed to critique Greeces anti-proselytism measuresâ€”measures which have been used as an instrument of discrimination as evidenced by the frequency of incarceration rates of minority believers.
Not only was the bias against unpopular and minority religious groups evident in Kokkinakis, but the reality that the domestic law has been used in a discriminatory fashion has also been reflected in the subsequent case law. For example, in Larissis, a group of Greek Pentecostal air force officers were convicted of proselytising to several of their â€˜subordinate fellow servicemen as well as a number of civilians under Greek law. The European court held that the Greek authorities were justified in protecting the rights of the subordinate servicemen and therefore did not find a violation of Article 9 in that particular instance because of the likelihood that the lower ranking airmen could potentially be subjected to â€˜improper pressure; however, the European court found that the Greek government could not justify the convictions of the Pentecostal Air Force officers in relation to the attempts of proselytising the civilians since the civilians were not subject to the same constraints and pressures of the lower-ranking airmen, and therefore, in violation of Article 9. The court reasoned,
[The] hierarchical structures which are a feature of life in the armed forces may colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel, making it difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of superior rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him. Thus, what would in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the confines of military life, be viewed as a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power.
Whilst understandable that the State was justified to intervene in order to protect the rights of the lower-ranking airmen since â€˜hierarchical structures of military life could make â€œit difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of superior rankâ€, the court avoided considering the question of whether the Greek legislation prohibiting proselytism was in and of itself a violation of Article 9. In this connection, it is evident that the courts failure to address whether the Greek criminalisation of the proselytism law ought to be reformed or abolished appears to demonstrate the European courts tacit approval of systematic state justifications of laws discriminating and negatively impacting the rights of religious minorities and new religious movements seeking to attract converts. In doing so, it appears that the court instituted its own objective assessment of how the laws would discriminate against the rights of religious minorities to proselytise rather than adopting a perspective acknowledging the vantage point of the religious minorities themselves. In other words, the court appears to dismiss the subjective experiences of the religious minorities in question; consequently, the courts â€œhave shown little regard for the plight of sincere, committed believers whose claims that States actions interfere with their religion or belief are routinely dismissed by institutions prepared to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the believersâ€.
3.3 Legitimate Aim
The court noted that the â€˜impugned measures of the Greek government were â€œin pursuit of a legitimate aim under Article 9(2)â€ in protecting â€œthe rights and freedoms of othersâ€. However, one of the most unsettling features of the courts reasoning in Kokkinakis is its failure to further develop this conclusion. Under Article 9(2), state limitations to the manifestation of belief are only justified â€œin the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of othersâ€, but one criticism levelled towards the approach in Kokkinakis is that â€œthe Court effectively holds that a government satisfies its burden by offering any justification that can be tied, however remotely, to the â€˜protection of the rights and freedoms of othersâ€. In other words, a government may sufficiently meet the â€˜legitimate aim requirement at its own discretion, irrespective of whether the government arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary or capricious manner as lo
Equality diversity and inclusion in dementia Essay
The term consent capacity means for an adult to have the ability to understand information relevant to making an informal or voluntary decision. A wide range of diseases, disorders, conditions and injuries can affect a personâ€™s ability to understand and give consent to information that has been relayed to them. Informed consent is a phrase often used in law to indicate that the consent from the individual meets the certain minimum standards. In order to give informed consent the individual concerned must have adequate reasoning faculties and be in possession of all relevant facts at the time that the consent is given.
Impairments to reasoning and judgment which may make it impossible for someone to give informed consent include such factors as basic intellectual or emotional immaturity, high levels of stress such as post-traumatic stress disorder or as severe mental retardation, severe mental illness, intoxication, severe sleep deprivation, Alzheimers disease, or being in a coma. Questioning and challenging decisions that are made by others this would depends on the mental capacity of the individual you want to support. First, you would obtain their permission and then you must get them to explain as exactly as possible what help they reckon they need.
Then you can offer further information, suggestions, and a plan to challenge such decisions. You could offer to be their spokesperson if they werent confident enough to speak out, or to accompany them to any hearing or appointment. However if the person is mentally impaired, you would have to get their signed permission to speak and act on their behalf before any health or social care workers would listen to you because of issues of confidentiality, you either have to be next of kin, or obtain powers of attorney or guardianship. How identity, self-image and self-esteem are linked is that self-esteem is how much you value yourself, in an ideal world this would be an equal to anyone purely on the basis of being human. Self-Image is the spinoff of countless self-esteem choices, and is basically your mental image of you as you are, usually not accurate. Identity is linked with this because everyone has their own identity and this is unique to each person. Peopleâ€™s identity is built up on their self-image and self-esteem. Every part of your life is influenced by your state of wellbeing.
These factors enhance personâ€™s wellbeing; a happy relationship with a partner, enjoyable and fulfilling career, a good network of closeÂ friends, a supporting family, enough money, regular exercise, a balanced diet and fun hobbies and leisure. There is lots of different uses for risk assessments for example there will always be a risk assessment carried out and the start of the day or the start of a shift, this is normally and formal risk assessment. You will also risk assess things as you are getting on with your work for example if there is an object in the middle of your path you will may move it out of the way or to the side so you and others can get past safely, these risk assessments you may not realise that you are doing them because they just seem obvious and come so easy to you. You may also risk assess whether people that are in your care are not likely to get injured or lost by contractors that are also using the facilities.
Every individual has rights of their own choices and decisions weather it is putting them at risk, this is why risk assessments are carried out to make sure the risks that the individual are willing to take is kept down to the lowest risk. As a carer you have responsibilities to make sure you and your service user are kept out of risks and danger. Risk assessments need to be regularly revised because peoples abilities change which could mean that they can no longer use stairs so you will have to risk assess what may happen if they were to use the stairs and how to prevent them from being at any danger. You also have to risk assess your ability to carry out some activities. So they need to regularly revised because you never know when an environment is going to change.
Write something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview.